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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3793

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, UR, PARM

SUBJ: REINFORCED MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, MARCH 14
(PART 2 OF TWO-PART MESSAGE)

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

1. AFTER LUNCHEON BREAK, DANISH REPS LED OFF AFTERNOON SESSION BY DISCUSSING EAST-WEST RELATIONS FROM METHODOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT. PERMREP SVART ATTEMPTED TO LOOK BEYOND CSCE AND MBFR TO DISCOVER HOW THE USSR WOULD THEN LOOK AND WHAT POLICIES THE WEST MIGHT ADOPT. HE NOTED THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT REMAIN UNAFFECTED BY WESTERN POSTURES. WHETHER THE SOVIETS WERE PERMANENTLY DEDICATED TO DETENTE, THEY WOULD STILL SEEK POWER AND SECURITY, AND THEIR DEFINITION OF SECURITY
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WAS TOTAL: POLITICAL, MILITARY AND IDEOLOGICAL.

2. SVART ASKED WHY THE USSR HAD ACCEPTED MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. POSSIBILITIES INCLUDED: (1) TO AVOID THE UNSETTLING SHOCK

TO WESTERN EUROPE THAT WOULD RESULT FROM A UNILATERAL U.S. REDUCTION LEADING TO EUROPE DEFENSE COOPERATION, (2) TO MAINTAIN A CLIMATE OF DETENTE, (3) IN ORDER TO OBTAIN WESTERN TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE AN ECONOMY THAT WAS NOT QUALITATIVELY ACCEPTABLE, WHILE AVOIDING THE NECESSITY OF ALLOWING MORE ECONOMIC FREEDOM IN THE USSR, AND (4) TO RAISE SOVIET LIVING STANDARDS.

3. SVART NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ADOPTED SUCH POLICIES BEFORE, BUT IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE REGIME, NOT AS A PERMANENT CHANGE. THE SOVIETS COULD REPEAT THE PROCESS.

4. THE PRIME SOVIET OBJECT WAS PROBABLY TO REACH PARITY IN POWER WITH THE U.S., AND MIGHT BE TO PERMANENTLY SHIFT THE BALANCE OF POWER.

SVART NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE KREMLIN WAS CAUTIOUS.

5. THE POSTURE FOR THE WEST MUST BE ONE OF CONVINCING READINESS TO CONTINUE THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE, BUT ALSO TO KEEP UP OUR STRENGTH. WE NEED A POSITIVE POLICY, BUT REALISTIC. THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO IMPROVE THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. SVART BELIEVED THAT A RENEWAL OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM WOULD COME ABOUT THROUGH THE PARTY, AND NOT AS THE RESULT OF DISSIDENT OPPOSITION.

6. SONNENFELDT THANKED SVART FOR HIS THOUGHTFUL AND STIMULATING COMMENTS. HE UNDERLINED THE FUNDAMENTAL POINT THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT VIEW DETENTE AS A FIXED STATE, BUT RATHER AS A PROCESS. FUTURE SOVIET DECISIONS WOULD BE AFFECTED BY HOW WE CONDUCTED DETENTE. IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, FOR EXAMPLE, WE SHOULD NOT THINK JUST OF BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, BUT RATHER OF BUILDING EAST-WEST INTERRELATIONSHIP THROUGH COOPERATION. ONCE THESE INTERRELATIONSHIPS WERE DEVELOPED, IF THE SOVIET LEADERS CONSIDERED REVERSING DETENTE, THEY WOULD BE FORCED TO CONSIDER THE HEAVY AND CONTINUING PENALTIES THEY WOULD HAVE TO PAY. SONNENFELDT SAID WE WOULD DENY OURSELVES IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES IF WE SAW DETENTE AS STATIC RATHER THAN AS A PROCESS THAT COULD PRODUCE A NETWORK OF INTERRELATIONSHIPS, AND THAT WE SHOULD AIM AT PRODUCING AS MUCH INTERACTION AS POSSIBLE

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WITH SOVIET ELITES. HE HOPED THAT THIS ASPECT COULD BE DISCUSSED FROM TIME-TO-TIME IN REINFORCED COUNCIL.

7. DANISH POLITICAL DIRECTOR BIERRING SPOKE OF THE MULTILATERAL DIALOGUE. THE SALIENT FEATURE IN MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY WAS TO COME TO GRIPS WITH ISSUES AND MARSHAL RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY TO OBTAIN CONCRETE RESULTS BY GIVING THE ALLIES A FAVORABLE BALANCE OF NEGOTIATING STRENGTH. THERE HAD BEEN A NUMBER OF BENEFICIAL EFFECTS FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AND VIENNA. THESE HAD: (1) GIVEN IMPETUS TO WESTERN COHESION AND DEMONSTRATED HOW USEFUL IT WAS TO STAND TOGETHER, (2) THE WEST THROUGH POOLING ITS EFFORTS HAD BEEN ABLE TO KEEP THE INITIATIVE AND FORMULATE REASONABLE POSITIONS TO ATTRACT WIDE SUPPORT, (3) TO EXPOSE EASTERN VULNERABILITY

TO PUBLIC DEBATE AND DEMONSTRATE THE LIMITS OF DETENTE, (4) TO SHOW THAT CONCERTED PRESSURE DID NOT LEAVE THE SOVIETS UNTOUCHED (AS THE SOLZHENITSYN EPISODE SHOWED), AND (5) TO POINT TO FURTHER PROBLEM AREAS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

8. BIERRING SAID THAT BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IF CSCE YIELDED LITTLE IT NEED NOT DETER THE ALLIES. POWERFUL COUNTRIES MIGHT FIND BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS MORE EFFICIENT. BUT SMALLER COUNTRIES SAW MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AS A WAY TO AVOID DIVISIVE TACTICS AND PRESSURES FROM MORE POWERFUL COUNTRIES ON THE OTHER SIDE.

9. FRENCH PERMREP DE ROSE ACKNOWLEDGED EARLIER QUESTIONS ABOUT RESULTS OF POMPIDOU MEETINGS ON THE BLACK SEA. HE HOPED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO HAVE INFORMATION FOR THE COUNCIL. BASED ON PRESS REPORTS, THE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN LENGTHY AND IN DEPTH. THE SOVIETS WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE LEVEL OF THE CSCE THIRD STAGE, AND HE NOTED POMPIDOU'S POSITION REPORTED IN THE PRESS. DESROSE HAD ALSO NOTED IN THE DISCUSSION A NUMBER OF IDEAS AND ISSUES REQUIRING THE CLOSEST ATTENTION OF ALLIANCE AUTHORITIES.

10. SOYSAL (TURKEY) WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY FOR CONSULTATIONS AMONG 15 ALLIES, NOTING TURKISH CONCERN ABOUT EFFECT OF DEVELOPMENT OF EC-NINE POSITIONS ON ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. ADDRESSING EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS, SOYSAL SAID CONSERVATIVE VIEWS OF HIS GOVERNMENT WERE WELL KNOWN, BUT THEY SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED NEGATIVE. TURKEY IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED TO ASCERTAIN THAT AGREED CRITERION OF UN-SECRET

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DIMINISHED SECURITY VIS-A-VIS THE USSR AND, IN ITS CASE, BULGARIA IS MAINTAINED IN MBFR.

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11. SOYSAL OBSERVED THAT RECENT GOVERNMENTAL CRISES IN TURKEY HAD SLOWED DOWN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST NEIGHBORS; NEW SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT MIGHT RENEW THESE INITIATIVES, BUT TURKEY'S BASIC EXTERNAL POLICIES HAD NOT CHANGED. TURKS WOULD REMAIN GOOD NEIGHBORS WITH COMMUNISTS, BUT VIGILANT ONES.

12. RECALLING SONNENFELDT'S REMARKS ABOUT U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERN ABOUT MFN PROVISIONS IN TRADE BILL, KILLICK INTERVENED A SECOND TIME TO CITE COMMON INTEREST OF ALL ALLIES IN WISHING U.S. GOVERNMENT SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING MODIFICATION OF BILL. OTHERWISE, IT APPEARED THAT U.S. PRESIDENT MIGHT VETO THE BILL. ALL ALLIES HAD ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND A COMMON WISH TO LIBERALIZE TRADE, BUT IF PRESIDENT WERE CONSTRAINED TO VETO BILL, U.S. ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE DEPRIVED OF BASIS TO PROCEED WITH MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN GATT FRAMEWORK.

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13. THERE BEING NO FURTHER SPEAKERS ON EAST-WEST ISSUES, SYG NOTED THAT THERE WAS A COMMON "STRONG FEELING ABOUT CONSULTATIONS" AND SUGGESTED THAT THIS SHOULD BE A THEME FOR REMARKS UNDER SECOND AGENDA ITEM.

14. AFTER SOME HESITATION, DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM)--DAVIGNON BEING ABSENT FROM AFTERNOON SESSION--TOOK FLOOR TO SPEAK FIRST OF "PRACTICE" OF CONSULTATIONS, WHICH SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD ALLUDED TO ON MARCH 4, AND THEN OF PROSPECTS FOR ATLANTIC DECLARATION.

15. ON FIRST TOPIC, DE STAERCKE SAID "PRACTICE" HAD NEVER BEEN FULLY DEFINED, BUT ALTERNATIVE OF NO CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE INTOLERABLE, AND WOULD LEAD TO A GENERAL COLLAPSE OF THE ALLIANCE. HE CHARACTERIZED ALLIANCE AS "A METHOD OF LIVING TOGETHER." ALLIED COUNTRIES, BEING FREE NATIONS, WOULD NEVER BE A BLOC. AS ISMAY HAD SAID, THE NAC IS A PLACE TO FIGHT, AND EVEN FROM TIME TO TIME TO AGREE. ALLIES HAD NO DIFFICULTY COMING TO TERMS WITH ITEMS ENTIRELY WITHIN ALLIANCE PURVIEW, SUCH AS ANNUAL FORCE REVIEWS AND MBFR.

16. ON OTHER HAND, IN HIS LONG EXPERIENCE WITH NATO, HE COULD

RECALL THAT PROBLEM OF CONSULTATIONS ON MATTERS OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE AREA HAD ARISEN AS EARLY AS SUEZ. WHEN SOVIETS SIMULTANEOUSLY MOVED FORCES INTO HUNGARY, THE ALLIANCE HAD VERY NEARLY COLLAPSED. SUBSEQUENTLY THE ALLIES HAD TRIED TO DEFINE CONSULTATIONS BASED ON ARTICLE III IN THE REPORT OF THE THREE WISE MEN. ALTHOUGH PROBLEM HAD NEVER REALLY BEEN SOLVED, ALLIES THEN HAD AGREED THAT DEGREE OF CONSULTATION ON AREAS OUTSIDE NATO SHOULD IN GENERAL TERMS BE SUCH THAT INTERNAL COHESION AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLIED SECURITY WERE NOT ENDANGERED. HE DID NOT CLAIM TO BE ABLE TO APPLY THIS FORMULA PRECISELY TO CURRENT QUESTIONS OF CONSULTATIONS ON MIDDLE EAST, WHERE ALLIES HAD VARYING INTERESTS, BUT HE THOUGHT HE COULD SAY WITH ASSURANCE THAT ALL ALLIES HOPE U.S. WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT.

17. ON ATLANTIC DECLARATION, DE STAERCKE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE 15 COULD ARRIVE AT A TEXT WITH "CERTAIN VIRTUES," PERHAPS NOT A PERFECT ONE. THE OUTLOOK SEEMED GOOD FOR A REAFFIRMATION OF ALLIED SOLIDARITY. INABILITY TO AGREE ON SUCH A REAFFIRMATION
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WOULD BE "DISASTROUS." IT WOULD ALSO BE A MAJOR DISASTER IF U.S. AND UK "FLOATED" THEIR POLICIES.

18. SONNENFELDT ASKED FOR FLOOR TO MAKE TWO POINTS. FIRST, HE HOPED THAT TERM "WEST-WEST" COULD BE AVOIDED IN DESCRIBING RELATIONS AMONG ALLIES. THIS COULD BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT THERE ARE TWO "WESTS," WHEN IN FACT IT WOULD BE MORE CONSISTENT WITH ALLIED PHILOSOPHY TO THINK OF ONE, OR 15. IN ADDITION, IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO USE A TERM SIMILAR TO "EAST" "WEST" RELATIONS, WHICH WERE OBVIOUSLY OF A DIFFERENT CHARACTER.

19. ON MORE GENERAL SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION, SONNENFELDT INVITED ALLIES TO CONSIDER MAKING A DISTINCTION THAT MIGHT HELP AVOID UNNECESSARY ANGUISH AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS. DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN CONSULTATIONS IN A FAST-MOVING SITUATION, WHERE ALLIES WERE AGREED ON A GENERAL COURSE OF ACTION, AND TACTICAL DECISIONS WERE BEING MADE UNDER PRESSURE, AND IN A SITUATION WHERE ALLIES WERE OVER A LONGER PERIOD CONSIDERING THE BASES FOR A GENERAL COURSE OF ACTION, PERHAPS INVOLVING NEW OR CHANGED POLICIES. ONLY IN THE LATTER CASE SHOULD ALLIES EXPECT CONSULTATIONS TO COME TO "FULL FRUITION." IF THIS DISTINCTION WERE KEPT IN MIND THERE MIGHT BE FEWER CASES WHERE ALLIES CONSIDERED THEMSELVES "INJURED PARTIES" AS A RESULT OF ABBREVIATED CONSULTATIONS.

20. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) SAID EXTENT OF CONSULTATIONS WITHIN ALLIANCE IS A THERMOMETER TO MEASURE HEALTH OF THE ALLIANCE ITSELF. IN NETHERLANDS VIEW, CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN A WIDE INTERPRETATION, AND MEMBERS SHOULD CONSULT ON ALL EVENTS WHICH IMPINGE ON MORE THAN ONE ALLY REGARDLESS OF WHERE EVENTS TAKE PLACE. CITING REPORT OF THREE WISE MEN AND HARMEL REPORT, HE OBSERVED THAT ALLIES HAD NEVER BEEN ABLE TO DRAW A PRECISE LINE BETWEEN

FULL CONSULTATIONS AND MERE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, AND HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE WISE TO TRY TO DRAW THIS LINE NOW.

21. VAN WELL (FRG) SAID THAT THE FRG ABSOLUTELY DEPENDED ON ALLIANCE CONSULTATION AND SUPPORT IN FORMULATING ITS FOREIGN POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE

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25. VAN WELL SAID THAT THE HARMONIZATION OF OUR NATIONAL POLICIES REQUIRES

THAT NOTHING STAND IN THE WAY OF ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES FOR DEALING WITH COMMON PROBLEMS. GERMANY HOPES THAT THE "DISTANT DIALOGUE" BETWEEN US WILL COME TO AN END AND THAT THE TWO DECLARATIONS WILL SOON COME TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

26. VAN WELL SAID THAT THE FRG TOOK A POSITIVE ATTITUDE ABOUT HOLDING SUCH REINFORCED COUNCIL MEETINGS IN THE FUTURE WHENEVER DEVELOPMENTS INDICATE THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE AS USEFUL AS THE CURRENT SESSION HAD PROVED TO BE.

27. SYG LUNS SPEAKING "AS A CITIZEN OF ONE OF THE EC MEMBER COUNTRIES AND AS ONE WHO HAD PLAYED A ROLE IN EUROPEAN UNIFICATION" SAID THAT EVERYONE APPLAUDED THE EFFORTS OF THE NINE TO UNITE. THIS IS NOT AN ISSUE. PROBLEMS ARISE, HOWEVER, WHEN THE NINE DO NOT COME TO A COMMON DECISION BUT MAINTAIN A FACADE OF FALSE UNITY TOWARD
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OUTSIDE COUNTRIES THROUGH FEAR THAT THEIR DIFFERENCES WILL BE REVEALED TO OTHERS. THUS, SAID LUNS, MANY THIRD COUNTRIES, NOT ONLY THE UNITED STATES, FEEL THAT THEY HAVE NO MEANS FOR AFFECTING DECISIONS OF THE NINE IN AREAS THAT CONCERN THEM.

28. NOTING THE REFERENCE BY OTHERS TO CRISIS MANAGMENT, LUNS NOTED THAT NATO HAD GONE TO SOME EFFORT TO SET UP CRISIS MACHINERY AFTER THE 1968 CZECH CRISIS. MEANS FOR DEALING WITH CRISES, THEREFORE, EXIST "WITHIN THIS HOUSE." LUNS WONDERED HOW HE SHOULD RESPOND WHEN OTHERS, SUCH AS THE TURKS HAD RECENTLY DONE, ASK HIM WHAT THE NINE MEAN WHEN THEY TALK ABOUT THEIR OWN CRISIS MANAGEMENT MACHINERY. LUNS SAID ALL THESE FACTORS POINT UP THE GREAT NEED FOR THE NINE TO BRING APPROPRIATE QUESTIONS INTO THE COUNCIL FOR MEANGINFUL CONSULATION. LUNS HAD FELT IT HIS DUTY TO PUBLICLY EXPRESS HIMSELF ON THIS QUESTION AFTER THE MINISTERIAL MEETING. HE FELT HE HAD ARIGHT TO COMMENT SINCE, UPON HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE OVER ONE AND ONE-HALF YEARS AGO, HE HAD EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN TO THE NINE ABOUT POSSIBLE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THEIR OWN DEVELOPING CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIP AND ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS. LUNS SAID HE HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES AT THAT TIME THAT THE NINE ENVISAGED NO SUCH CONFLICT.

29. NORWEGIAN PERMREP BUSCH SAID NORWAY HAD A DUAL IDENTITY BOTH AS AN ATLANTIC AND A EUROPEAN STATE. THIS MEANT THAT NORWAY WAS INTERESTED IN BOTH AREAS BUT ABOVE ALL WAS INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING HARMONIOUS RELATIONS WITH NORTH AMERICA. NORWAY RECOGNIZED THE MERITS OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE NINE AND THESE HAD USUALLY BEEN USEFUL AS IN THE CASE OF CSCE. NOR DO THESE CONSULTATIONS NORMALLY CONFLICT WITH NATO'S DELIBERATIONS. BUSCH HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT THE NINE WOULD MAKE COMMON INPUTS TO NATO'S CONSULTATIVE PROCESS RATHER THAN INSERT ONLY HARD AND FAST DECISIONS.

30. ERALP (TURKISH PERMREP) AGREED WITH LUNS THAT THE ALLIANCE COULD BE AT A CRITICAL POINT, NOT VIS-A-VIS THE EAST, BUT IN ITS OWN INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS. HE SAID THAT THE ALLIANCE FALREUPS WHICH HAD RECENTLY OCCURRED WERE "FOR THE GODS" BUT HE SAID THAT PERMREPS MUST CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH THINGS IN THEIR USUAL CALM MANNER.

31. WITH REGARD TO CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE EC AND US, THE TURKS JOINED OTHER NATO COUNTRIES IN NOT BEING IN ANY PRIVY TO
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THOSE DISCUSSIONS. THESE COUNTRIES DID NOT KNNOW WHAT PROBLEMS HAD ARISEN BETWEEN THE EC AND THE U.S., WHY MEETINGS HAD BEEN POSTPONED BETWEEN TEM, OR THE CONTENTS OF THE EC-US TEXT. TURKEY SOMETIMES FOUND IT EASIER TO ASK ABOUT FRENCH RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAN ABOUT THOSE BETWEEN THE INE AND THE U.S. ERALP SAID HE HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES UPON HIS ARRIVAL AT NATO TWO YEARS AGO THAT THE VIEWS OF THE NON-NINE WOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EC POSITIONS. HE SAID THIS

WAS NO LONGER CERTAIN.

32. ERALP THOUGHT THAT CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CONSULTATION WERE "ALL IMPORTANT" FOR THE ALLIANCE. HE CITED PARA FOUR OF THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE WHICH HE THOUGH SHOULD HAVE INCLUDED LANAGUAGE CALLING FOR TIMELINESS IN THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS. HE SAID THERE WAS NO LACK OF CONSULTATION IN NATO-AND HE CITED THE REGIONAL EXPERTS MEETINGS AND VOLUMINOUS PAPERS REFLECTING CONSULTATION ON A WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS. TIMELINESS WAS THE KEY, HOWEVER, AND GOES TO THE QUESTION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT. HE THOUGH OTHER NATO MEMBERS SHOULD ASK THE NINE MORE FREQUENTLY ABOUT WHAT THE EC WAS DOING AND THINKING. ERALP SAID THAT EVERYONE SHARED THE HOPE FOR A EUROPE GROWING IN STRENGTH AND POWER BUT THAT THEY ALSO WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THAT GROWTH PROCESS.

33. KILLICK (UK) REFERRED AGAIN TO STATEMENTS OF ULL SUPPORT FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN THE QUEEN'S SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT ABOUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM. ALTHOUGH NOT AUTHORIZED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, KILLICK SPOKE ON A PERSONAL BASIS, BUT "WITH CONFIDENCE," THAT HIS GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH LUCKY IN THAT IT COULDD DISCLAIM ALL RESPONSIBIL

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3. AS TO THE FORM OF MINISTERIAL SESSIONS, GREECE FULLY AGREED WITH THE FRG PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY THE ADVANCE DISTRIBUTION OF TEXTS OF MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS. THIS SHOULD LEAD TO DEEPER AND MORE WIDE-RANGING MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS.

40. HALSTEAD (CANADA) SAID IT WAS TIMELY TO DISCUSS CONSULTATIONS, SINCE ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND STRENGTH WERE ESSENTIAL. HE SUGGESTED CONCENTRATION ON PRACTICE, NOT FORMULAS, DEEDS AND NOT WORDS. AS TO CONSULTATION PRACTICES, THERE WAS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROVIDING INFORMATION -- SO THERE WOULD BE NO SURPRISES -- AND TRUE CONSULTATIONS. THERE SHOULD BE CONSULTATIONS ON MATTERS OF DIRECT RELEVANCE TO THE SECURITY AND INTERESTS OF ALLIANCE MEMBERS. CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE TIMELY, AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALLIED VIEWS. IF ALLIES WERE CONSULTED, THEY MUST SHARE RESPONSIBILITY.

41. HALSTEAD CONTINUED THAT THERE WERE SOME SUBJECTS AND EVENTS OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA OF MORE DIRECT RELEVANCE AND IMPACT THAN
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SUCH EVENTS WITHIN THE TREATY AREA.

42. A DISTINCTION COULD ALSO BE DRAWN BETWEEN TACTICAL AND POLICY MATTERS. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSULT ABOUT THE LATTER AND TACTICS WOULD THEN BE OF RELATIVELY LESS IMPORTANCE. THE POLICY FRAMEWORK SHOULD BE SET AS A RESULT OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SET RULES OR FORMULAS. COMMON SENSE SHOULD GUIDE ALLIES TO CONSULT.

43. HALSTEAD REFERRED TO CURRENT ENERGY QUESTIONS. THIS HAD ITS RELEVANCE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE, BUT ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE PROBLEM DIRECTLY CONCERNED NATO AND IT SHOULD TAKE CARE NOT TO INTERFERE WITH OTHER BODIES SUCH AS THE OECD IN THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS.

44. CANADA SUPPORTED AND UNDERSTOOD THE EFFORTS OF THE NINE TO CONCERT POLICIES. THE MORE SO BECAUSE OF THE EVOLVING SITUATION OF THE NINE. HALSTEAD ASSUMED, HOWEVER, THAT THE NINE WOULD SEE VALUE IN WIDER ALLIANCE HARMONIZATION. CANADA HAD BEEN GLAD TO OBSERVE THIS IN THE CSCE CONTEXT.

45. THE CARDINAL POINT IN CANADA'S APPROACH TO EUROPE WAS THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA. THE ALLIANCE WAS THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH CANADA PURSUED ITS INTERESTS WITH BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE.

46. FRENCH PERMREP DE ROSE AGREED WITH SONNENFELDT'S EARLIER COMMENT ON THE PHRASE "WEST-WEST" RELATIONS. AS TO PROVIDING INFORMATION AND ENGAGING IN CONSULTATIONS, DE ROSE REFERRED TO HIS FEBRUARY 13 STATEMENT TO THE COUNCIL. HE UNDERLINED THAT PROVIDING INFORMATION AND CONSULTING WERE AUXILIARIES TO THE COMMITMENTS OF THE TREATY. THE TWO CONCEPTS COVERED TWO REALITIES AND WHILE IT WAS NOT ALWAYS EASY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THEM IT WAS WRONG TO CONSUME THEM.

47. CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NINE AND THE FIFTEEN, DE ROSE AGREED THAT THE EMERGENCE OF THE EC MAY AFFECT THE ALL-

ANCE, SINCE THE NINE HAVE DECIDED TO GIVE POLITICAL FINALITY TO THEIR ASSOCIATION. BUT IF AVOIDING FAITS ACCOMPLIS MEANT THAT THE NINE MUST SUBMIT THEIR DECISIONS TO THE FIFTEEN, THERE WOULD BE POLITICAL SUBORDINATION. SECRETARY DULLES HIMSELF SAID
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THAT THERE COULD BE NO SUBORDINATION OF A COUNTRY'S DECISIONS TO THE COUNCIL. IT FOLLOWED THAT THERE COULD BE NO SUCH SUBORDINATION OF THE POLITICAL COMPETENCE OF THE NINE.

48. DE ROSE MAINTAINED THAT THE NINE WERE CAREFUL TO AVOID INTRUDING ON THE COMPETENCE OF THE ALLIANCE IN DEFENSE MATTERS. THE EC IDENTITY DOCUMENT SHOWED THAT. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EC WILL IMPROVE THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS TO DEFENSE. DE ROSE OBSERVED THAT SEVERAL SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS HAD REFERRED TO HIS FEBRUARY 13 STATEMENT WHEN SPEAKING OF CONSULTATIONS. THIS SHOWED THAT THIS STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN STUDIED WITH GREAT ATTENTION, AND HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD SIMILARLY ADDRESS THE STATEMENTS MADE HERE TODAY.

49. LUNS QUESTIONED WHETHER "SUBORDINATION" WAS THE BEST WORD TO USE WHEN SPEAKING OF THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COUNCIL. NO ONE QUESTIONED A COUNTRY'S RIGHT TO TAKE DECISIONS IN ITS OWN INTERESTS. WHAT THE ALLIES SOUGHT WERE CONSULTATIONS AMONG MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE. THE ISSUE IS WHETHER MATTERS AFFECTING OTHER ALLIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY THE NINE.

50. GARDINI (ITALY) NOTED THAT NATO CONSULTATIONS ON SECURITY MATTERS WERE COMPULSORY. CONSULTATIONS MUST EVOLVE IN A MORE CONSTANT AND HARMONIOUS FASHION.

51. GARDINI THOUGHT THAT CONSULTATIONS IN THE REINFORCED COUNCIL COULD MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION. THE FORUM SHOULD NOT BE INSTITUTIONALIZED, BUT SHOULD BE USED ON AN AD HOC BASIS.

52. BIERRING (DENMARK) APPEALED FOR SOLIDARITY IN THE ALLIANCE, AS NECESSARY AS EVER BEFORE. THE ALLIANCE WAS NOW A FOCAL POINT FOR CHANGE. THERE SHOULD BE GOODWILL AND SERIOUS EFFORTS TOWARD ACCOMMODATIONS BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF THE NINE AND THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

53. RECALLING DE ROSE STATEMENT, SONNENFELDT SAID IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S YEAR OF EUROPE SPEECH HAD LEFT IMPRESSION THAT US SAW FIVE WORLD POWER CENTERS, ALL WITH EQUAL VALUE, AND IN VIEW OF SOME SEEMED TO EQUATE ALLIES WITH ADVERSARIES. IN FACT, THE SPEECH HAD BEEN INTENDED NOT ONLY AS AN EXPRESSION OF US COMMITMENT TO NATO,
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BUT NEED FOR ITS REVITALIZATION. ALTHOUGH IT HAD COME TO BE

SEEN IN SOME QUARTERS AS A US EFFORT TO SUBORDINATE OTHER NATIONS, THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS IN NATO AS WE SEE IT -- THAT IS TO HEAR OUR ALLIES OUT AND USE THE INPUT IN FORMING COMMON POLICY -- DOES NOT MEAN SUBORDINATION OF THE ALLIES TO US, OR VICE-VERSA.

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15

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OMB-01 DRC-01 EB-11 /172 W
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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4612

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3797

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA UNN

USMISSION BERLIN

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54. SONNENFELDT SAID DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE MUST CONTINUE IN NAC AND OTHER FORA AND IN GOVERNMENTS. WE ARE REALLY DISCUSSING THE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE AND OUR WAY OF LIFE. HE DEPLORED THE NOTION OF "SUBORDINATION." IN THIS CONTEXT, THE SECRETARY'S APRIL 23 SPEECH TRIED TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION ARISING FROM OUR PERCEPTION THAT ALLIES WERE BEING EQUATED WITH ADVERSARIES. WE FELT THE TIME HAD COME TO REVITALIZE RELATIONS. THIS HAD COME TO BE REGARDED AS AN EFFORT AT SUBORDINATION OR DOMINATION. FOR OUR PART, HOWEVER, WE HAD NEVER THOUGHT THAT HAVING OUR POLICIES SUBJECTED TO ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION AND CONSULTATION, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF OTHERS IN ANY WAY "SUBORDINATED" THE US. ON THE CONTRARY, IT STRENGTHENS US AND THE ALLIANCE. WE DO NOT SEE THE PROFOUND PROBLEM AS BEING THAT THE ALLIANCE CANNOT COMPREHEND THE COUNTRIES OF THE NINE, BUT THAT IT CAN DO SO ONLY IF THE NINE, IN FORMING THEIR IDENTITY, DO NOT RPT NOT DO SO ON THE BASIS OF EXCLUSIVITY. FROM OUR STAND-POINT, THAT EC-9 IDENTITY NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED IN TERMS

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THAT SEPARATE EC FROM US, EVEN IF THEIR IDENTITY IS STILL FRAGILE. MANY MANIFESTATIONS OF IDENTITY OF THE NINE HAVE PROCEEDED FROM THE APPARENT VIEW THAT DISTINCTNESS WILL ENHANCE IDENTITY. DIFFERENCES OF INTEREST NEED NOT BE TURNED INTO OPPOSITION OF INTEREST. ALLIES SHOULD TALK ABOUT THEIR DIFFERENCES, AND THEN DEVELOP A HARMONIZED POLICY THAT TAKES ACCOUNT OF THESE DIFFERENCES. ALLIES CANNOT EXPECT TO HAVE UNITY OF PURPOSE, VALUES, AND POLICY IF THEY DO NOT HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITHIN ALLIANCE TO EXPLORE DIFFERENCES FRANKLY. THE NINE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF LARGER GOALS AND INITY. THESE DISCUSSIONS MUST CONTINUE IN NAC AND IN CAPITALS IN A SPIRIT OF TOLERANCE; WHAT IS AT STAKE IS SAFETY AND FUTURE OF THIS ASSOCIATION OF FREE SOCIETIES.

55. DE ROSE CLARIFIED EARLIER REMARKS, STATING THAT HE HAD ONLY INTENDED TO CAST DOUBT ON ANY PROPOSAL FOR NEW ALLIED CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY. HE DID NOT WISH TO DISPARAGE IMPORTANCE OR VALUE OF EARLIER ALLIED CONSULTATIONS ON SUCH ISSUES AS BERLIN. HOWEVER, ANY NEW ACTION TO CREATE CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY WOULD BE SUBJECT TO A RESERVATION ON THE PART OF FRANCE.

56. HARTOGH SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MENTION UP TO THAT MOMENT OF POSSIBLE VISIT BY PRESIDENT NIXON. SINCE ALLIES WERE STILL WORKING TOWARDS A HYPOTHETICAL DATE IN LATE APRIL, HE WONDERED IF ANY NEW LIGHT COULD BE SHED. SYG REPLIED THAT ON THE BASIS OF HIS PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS, THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN CURRENT ASSUMPTIONS.

57. SUMMING UP, SYG SAID CONSULTATIONS HAD COVERED THE NETWORK OF CURRENT BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EAST-WEST CONTACTS. HE THOUGHT HE COULD DRAW THE CONSLUSION THAT THE NETWORK SERVED TO LIMIT SOVIET MANEUVERABILITY. ALTHOUGH THE ALLIES' MANEUVERABILITY WAS ALSO SOMEWHAT LIMITED, THERE WAS A CONSENSUS THAT THIS PROCESS OF EAST-WEST CONTACTS SHOULD GO ON.

58. ON THE CSCE, ALLIES WOULD NEED TO MAKE CERTAIN CONCRETE DECISIONS QUITE SOON, IN PARTICULAR WHAT CONCESSIONS TO EXTRACT IN RETURN FOR SOVIET DESIRE TO HAVE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING IN THIRD PHASE. SOME ALLIES WISH TO HAVE A COUNCIL MEETING ON CSCE MATTERS DURING EASTER RECESS. ALLIES SEEMED TO AGREE ON CAUTION BEFORE ANY DEVIATION FROM AGREED MBFR POSITIONS, AND ON IMPORTANCE
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OF MAINTAINING MULTILATERAL CHARACTER OF MBFR TALKS.

59. LUNS CONTINUED THAT DISCUSSION OF CONSULTATIONS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT PROBLEMS WERE PERHAPS INEVITABLE, BUT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT ALLIANCE IS COLLAPSING. IN PARTICULAR, THERE ARE PROBLEMS ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NINE AND THE FIFTEEN.

IN HIS VIEW THE INTENTIONS OF THE NINE HAVE BEEN LAUDABLE, BUT SOME PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION WITH OTHER ALLIES SHOULD BE ARRIVED AT. SEVERAL ALLIES HAD ALSO POINTED OUT SUPERFICIALITY OF ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND FULL CONSULTATION, AND BETWEEN CONSULTATIONS ON MATTERS INSIDE AS OPPOSED TO OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE. THERE WAS CONSENSUS AMONG THOSE WHO ADDRESSED THE ISSUE THAT ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO DRAFT ATLANTIC DECLARATION.

60. SYG CONCLUDED MEETING BY READING DRAFT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT STATING THAT ALLIES HAD HAD CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS, WHICH WAS APPROVED. RUMSFELD

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